Suffering and Death
Suffering is overrated. Mother
Teresa saw beauty in suffering, (1, p. 11). She has likened it to a kiss
from Jesus, (2). Likewise, I think that the general population holds an
implicit view that is similar to this.
Death, on the other hand, is vastly underrated. Death is one of the most efficient remedies to suffering. Death is only problematic insofar as it generates suffering for those who are still alive. However, avoidance of death on these grounds is often only delaying the inevitable. Furthermore, it seems wrong to make someone suffer for ones own benefit. Insofar as this principle is agreed upon, we should strive to offer death to those in need.
Washington state does have one measly Death With Dignity Act. It is quite pathetic in scope. The act only allows death for those with 6 months or less to live, (3). Last year, lethal medication was dispensed to scant 200 patients, (3). Not all of them have taken the medication, but I find that to be ethically irrelevant. I find the fact that a patient must ask for the right to a graceful exit to be morally disgusting.
Blackstone's formulation is the principle that it is better to let ten criminals free than convict one innocent person. Our courts operate on this principle. The phrase "innocent until proven guilty" is one manifestation of this commitment. I, for one, agree with this principle as a matter of law. Naturally, in this analogy, life is the prison, and death is freedom. It is better to kill ten people than to let one suffer unwillingly. Likewise, it is better to prevent births when the baby is likely to suffer.
Schizophrenia is a genetic psychotic disorder. More specifically, it may be a genetic sleep disorder, (4). The rate of attempted suicide in schizophrenics is extremely high. The lower-bound estimate for suicide attempts among schizophrenics is 20%, (5). This 5:1 ratio fails to conform to the Blackstone ratio of 10:1. As such, this seems to be one of the more obvious cases where births should be prevented. Even sadder, many of those attempting suicide will never succeed. At the very least, schizophrenics should be given suicide drugs at the time of diagnosis.
There is a nonprofit organization called the Final Exit Network; named after the book "Final Exit." They offer information on how to commit suicide. By the bounds of law, they cannot directly assist in the suicide, but they can provide company and support. I'd certainly like to volunteer with them. However, even they are insufficient. They run each case by a team of doctors; a practice I find despicable, as it again enters the territory of asking permission. Nevertheless, it is not quite clear how much of their practice is designed to keep themselves safe from the law.
Antinatalists argue that it is unethical to have children. From a deontological perspective, their case is strong. Reproduction is a gamble with someone else's life. Nevertheless, there are other ways around this. In any case, as a utilitarian I am forced to explore alternative solutions to ending unwilling suffering.
People often ascribe value to suffering where there is none. People with pain asymbolia lack negative associations with painful stimuli. In effect, they are able to experience the sensation of pain without the associated suffering. Of course, this flies against the very notion of "pain," and will likely require a new word in the dictionary. In any case, these people can be trained to avoid damaging situations without the need to suffer. As such, suffering seems unnecessary in this regard.
Some people, such as myself, might assume that suffering is necessary for empathy. It turns out, however, that this is just an assumption without much empirical backing. People with congenital analgesia are born with a complete inability to feel physical pain. Unlike those with pain asymbolia, they'd have no way of knowing if their finger was broken without looking. Nevertheless, these people seem to have no deficit in empathizing with those in physical pain, (6).
However, humans are not the only, nor even the primary subjects to which these concerns apply. One obvious example is research animals. If death is ultimately not a big deal, can it be justified to torture animals for the sake of preventing human death?
From a deontological, rights based perspective, food animals deserve immediate extermination. The suffering imposed on farms is beyond reasonable comprehension of the human mind. We have bred entire species predicated on disease causing selections. Chickens, for example, can grow too large before there bones are developed and become crippled with arthritis.
Indeed, the scope of concern for non-human animals extends much further than that. The modern philosopher Brian Tomasik argues that Wild Animal Suffering (WAS) is unacceptable. He argues that suffering outweighs happiness in nature, and that we should reduce biomass to eliminate foodstuffs that fuel suffering. Brian Tomasik is a negative utilitarian, meaning that he only cares about reducing suffering. His arguments are so compelling that I, as a classical utilitarian, can't help but to agree. From the perspective of a negative utilitarian, total destruction of earth is an ideal solution to WAS. Even to a classical utilitarian, I'd argue that this is a reasonable solution if one doesn't believe that society will remedy the situation one day.
There is another solution that I would be remiss were I to fail to mention. The modern philosopher David Pearce argues that we should use biotechnology to abolish suffering throughout the living world. In humans, the first step is using eugenic technologies to weed out unfavorable genotypes. The aim is to upregulate the hedonic set point, such that the spectrum of experience lies well above hedonic zero. Being set on fire would merely be less pleasant than a back massage, rather than horrific. The potential of preimplantation genetic screening and genetic engineering is boundless.
Eugenics has historically received a bad name. Largely, this is a function of the utilization of negative eugenics. That is to say, we would forcefully prevent people from breeding. In contrast, positive eugenics promotes the advancement of desired genes. Furthermore, the interest of those being born is oft not considered. Selecting against depression and anxiety are moral imperatives. Whether it is ethical to sterilize depressives, schizophrenics, and the anxious is a more sensitive issue. Given my Ashkenazi ancestry, and the rate of CNS diseases among Ashkenazi Jews, it seems that I should not be allowed to procreate via natural means. What is clear is that people must be offered the chance to use biotechnology to eliminate these risks in their offspring.
In summary, the utility of death needs to be taken more seriously. Furthermore, suffering is a much neglected issue. It is unethical to force life on the suffering. Even to allow the suffering to live is ethically questionable.
Death, on the other hand, is vastly underrated. Death is one of the most efficient remedies to suffering. Death is only problematic insofar as it generates suffering for those who are still alive. However, avoidance of death on these grounds is often only delaying the inevitable. Furthermore, it seems wrong to make someone suffer for ones own benefit. Insofar as this principle is agreed upon, we should strive to offer death to those in need.
Washington state does have one measly Death With Dignity Act. It is quite pathetic in scope. The act only allows death for those with 6 months or less to live, (3). Last year, lethal medication was dispensed to scant 200 patients, (3). Not all of them have taken the medication, but I find that to be ethically irrelevant. I find the fact that a patient must ask for the right to a graceful exit to be morally disgusting.
Blackstone's formulation is the principle that it is better to let ten criminals free than convict one innocent person. Our courts operate on this principle. The phrase "innocent until proven guilty" is one manifestation of this commitment. I, for one, agree with this principle as a matter of law. Naturally, in this analogy, life is the prison, and death is freedom. It is better to kill ten people than to let one suffer unwillingly. Likewise, it is better to prevent births when the baby is likely to suffer.
Schizophrenia is a genetic psychotic disorder. More specifically, it may be a genetic sleep disorder, (4). The rate of attempted suicide in schizophrenics is extremely high. The lower-bound estimate for suicide attempts among schizophrenics is 20%, (5). This 5:1 ratio fails to conform to the Blackstone ratio of 10:1. As such, this seems to be one of the more obvious cases where births should be prevented. Even sadder, many of those attempting suicide will never succeed. At the very least, schizophrenics should be given suicide drugs at the time of diagnosis.
There is a nonprofit organization called the Final Exit Network; named after the book "Final Exit." They offer information on how to commit suicide. By the bounds of law, they cannot directly assist in the suicide, but they can provide company and support. I'd certainly like to volunteer with them. However, even they are insufficient. They run each case by a team of doctors; a practice I find despicable, as it again enters the territory of asking permission. Nevertheless, it is not quite clear how much of their practice is designed to keep themselves safe from the law.
Antinatalists argue that it is unethical to have children. From a deontological perspective, their case is strong. Reproduction is a gamble with someone else's life. Nevertheless, there are other ways around this. In any case, as a utilitarian I am forced to explore alternative solutions to ending unwilling suffering.
People often ascribe value to suffering where there is none. People with pain asymbolia lack negative associations with painful stimuli. In effect, they are able to experience the sensation of pain without the associated suffering. Of course, this flies against the very notion of "pain," and will likely require a new word in the dictionary. In any case, these people can be trained to avoid damaging situations without the need to suffer. As such, suffering seems unnecessary in this regard.
Some people, such as myself, might assume that suffering is necessary for empathy. It turns out, however, that this is just an assumption without much empirical backing. People with congenital analgesia are born with a complete inability to feel physical pain. Unlike those with pain asymbolia, they'd have no way of knowing if their finger was broken without looking. Nevertheless, these people seem to have no deficit in empathizing with those in physical pain, (6).
However, humans are not the only, nor even the primary subjects to which these concerns apply. One obvious example is research animals. If death is ultimately not a big deal, can it be justified to torture animals for the sake of preventing human death?
From a deontological, rights based perspective, food animals deserve immediate extermination. The suffering imposed on farms is beyond reasonable comprehension of the human mind. We have bred entire species predicated on disease causing selections. Chickens, for example, can grow too large before there bones are developed and become crippled with arthritis.
Indeed, the scope of concern for non-human animals extends much further than that. The modern philosopher Brian Tomasik argues that Wild Animal Suffering (WAS) is unacceptable. He argues that suffering outweighs happiness in nature, and that we should reduce biomass to eliminate foodstuffs that fuel suffering. Brian Tomasik is a negative utilitarian, meaning that he only cares about reducing suffering. His arguments are so compelling that I, as a classical utilitarian, can't help but to agree. From the perspective of a negative utilitarian, total destruction of earth is an ideal solution to WAS. Even to a classical utilitarian, I'd argue that this is a reasonable solution if one doesn't believe that society will remedy the situation one day.
There is another solution that I would be remiss were I to fail to mention. The modern philosopher David Pearce argues that we should use biotechnology to abolish suffering throughout the living world. In humans, the first step is using eugenic technologies to weed out unfavorable genotypes. The aim is to upregulate the hedonic set point, such that the spectrum of experience lies well above hedonic zero. Being set on fire would merely be less pleasant than a back massage, rather than horrific. The potential of preimplantation genetic screening and genetic engineering is boundless.
Eugenics has historically received a bad name. Largely, this is a function of the utilization of negative eugenics. That is to say, we would forcefully prevent people from breeding. In contrast, positive eugenics promotes the advancement of desired genes. Furthermore, the interest of those being born is oft not considered. Selecting against depression and anxiety are moral imperatives. Whether it is ethical to sterilize depressives, schizophrenics, and the anxious is a more sensitive issue. Given my Ashkenazi ancestry, and the rate of CNS diseases among Ashkenazi Jews, it seems that I should not be allowed to procreate via natural means. What is clear is that people must be offered the chance to use biotechnology to eliminate these risks in their offspring.
In summary, the utility of death needs to be taken more seriously. Furthermore, suffering is a much neglected issue. It is unethical to force life on the suffering. Even to allow the suffering to live is ethically questionable.
References
1. Hitchens, C. (1995). The missionary position: Mother Teresa in theory and practice. New York: Verso
2. WHATEVER
YOU DID UNTO ONE OF THE LEAST, YOU DID UNTO ME. (n.d.). Retrieved June
13, 2018, from http://www.ewtn.com/New_
3.
Center for Health Statistics. (2018) Death With Dignity Act Report.
Retrieved June 13, 2018, from
https://www.doh.wa.gov/
4. D’Agostino, A., Castelnovo, A., Cavallotti, S., Casetta, C., Marcatili,
M., Gambini, O., … Sarasso, S. (2018). Sleep endophenotypes of
schizophrenia: slow waves and sleep spindles in unaffected first-degree
relatives. NPJ Schizophrenia, 4, 2. http://doi.org/10.1038/s41537-
5. Verma, D., Srivastava, M. K., Singh, S. K., Bhatia, T., & Deshpande,
S. N. (2016). Lifetime suicide intent, executive function and insight
in schizophrenia and schizoaffective disorders. Schizophrenia Research, 178(1-3), 12–16. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.
6.
Danziger N, Faillenot I, Peyron R. Can We Share a Pain We Never Felt?
Neural Correlates of Empathy in Patients with Congenital Insensitivity
to Pain. Neuron 61: 203–212, 2009.
